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Abstract: After the destructive impact of the global financial crisis of 2008, many believe 
that pre-crisis financial market regulation did not take the ``big picture'' of the system 
sufficiently into account and, subsequently, financial supervision mainly ``missed the 
forest for the trees''. As a result, the need for macroprudential aspects of regulation 
emerged, which has recently become the focal point of many policy debates. This has 
also led to intense discussion on the contours of monetary policy after the post-crisis 
``new normal''. Here, I review recent progress in empirical and theoretical research on 
the effectiveness of macroprudential tools, as well as the current state of the debate, in 
order to extract common policy conclusions. The work highlights that, despite the 
achievements in the literature, the current experience and knowledge of how 
macroprudential instruments work, their calibration, and the mechanisms through 
which they interact with each other and with monetary policy are rather limited and 
conflicting.  Moreover, I critically survey and note the current challenges faced by 
macroprudential regulation in creating stable, yet efficient financial systems.  At the 
same time, I emphasize the importance of accepting that many risks may remain, 
requiring that we proceed prudently and develop better plans for future crises. 
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1 Introduction
The turmoil of the recent financial crisis and the economic downswing
that followed has raised a fundamental debate on the need to re-orient the
financial regulatory framework for fostering financial stability through bet-
ter regulation and supervision of financial markets Blanchard et al. (2010),
Yellen (2011). The growing complexity had made it difficult for policy-
makers to assess the potential spillovers between the financial institutions
and markets because banks were heavily interconnected and highly lever-
aged, financial intermediation had shifted to the shadow banking sector,
both funding and market liquidity risks were higher than expected, and
there was a critical absence of effective mechanisms to deal with systemi-
cally important financial institutions. In terms of policy, crisis of 2008 has
demonstrated that neither traditional financial regulation, usually called
microprudential, nor price stability are sufficient to guarantee the safety and
soundness of the overall financial system. Moreover, it has revealed that the
“originate-to-distribute” model of bank lending needs to be strengthened
and more regulated (Berndt & Gupta 2009, Purnanandam 2011). The pol-
icy debate is mainly concentrated on taming the procyclical nature of the
capital requirement in Basel II (Borio & Zhu 2012, Angeloni & Faia 2013),
constraining agents’ incentives to build-up excessive leverage (Dell’Ariccia
et al. 2017, Valencia 2014) and reducing liquidity (van den End & Kruidhof
2013) and maturity mismatch (Brunnermeier et al. 2014) risks.
The crisis has fostered a recognition that systemic risks can grow un-
der the surface of apparent economic tranquility (Acemoglu et al. 2015).
Therefore, financial stability should not emerge as a natural by-product of
an appropriate macroeconomic policy mix. Rather, achieving the objective
of financial stability requires dedicated macroprudential policy. Moreover,
to guarantee macroeconomic stability, monetary policy may adopt financial
stability as an additional objective. However, a new objective requires new
instruments that are able to target specific sources of financial imbalances,
where monetary policy is “too blunt a tool”:
“[...]the contours of the macroeconomic policy of the future are only
slowly coming into focus. From macroeconomic to financial stability,
policy makers have realized that they have to watch many targets. They
have also realized that they have potentially many more instruments at
their disposal, from macroprudential tools to unconventional monetary
policy. But how to map instruments to targets remains very much
a work in progress. [...]”(Olivier Blanchard, “Rethinking Macro
Policy II: First Steps and Early Lessons”, Washington, DC, April
16-17, 2013)
The economic collapse has catalyzed the attention of policymakers on
the very nature of financial crises, stimulating a fresh wave of research.
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This research focuses on the need for a new macro-based financial regu-
lation regime, aimed at defining and measuring systemic risk and creating
mechanisms to constrain the mitigation of the latter:
“[...]three “must haves” - microprudential regulation, supervision, and
resolution a are necessary, but as the crisis has made clear, they are not
sufficient to rein in systemic risks. They must be complemented by
an overarching macroprudential framework and a set of new tools to
complete the toolkit to address systemic risks. [...]”(Jose Vinals, “Re-
building Financial Markets”, Frankfurt, 9–11 November 2010)
The Basel III financial regulatory accord emerged as a result. Despite the
progress in policy design, the implementation of the macroprudential policy
framework is still in an embryonic stage. However, the policy perimeter and
discussions are quite extensive. The policy discussion focuses particularly
on the implementation and effectiveness of macroprudential instruments,
as well as on their relationship with monetary policy and their impact on
macroeconomic performance:
“[...]It was clear that the two standard tools, fiscal and monetary policy,
were not the right ones to deal with financial imbalances and risks. The
question then was: is macroprudential policy going to be the third leg of
macroeconomic policy, or just a crutch to help the first two?[...]”(Olivier
Blanchard, IMF Direct blog, 29 April 2013)
I focus on and provide an overview of macroprudential policy line re-
search. Here, I emphasize the macroeconomic perspective and the implica-
tions of macroprudential tools, as well as their limits. I also underline the
question of conflicts and trade-offs between the monetary policy and macro-
prudential policy. By drawing parallels with research literature on macro-
prudential policy effects and monetary policy, this study aims to contribute
to the evolving debate. The objectives are to lay out key concepts and an
agreed terminology, and to assess existing practices, the state of knowledge,
and priorities for future work in the macroprudential policy framework.
I find that the recent progress in empirical and theoretical literature both
on the impact of macroprudential policy, and on the interaction schemes be-
tween macroprudential and monetary policies, have still provided limited
guidance for policy implementation. Nevertheless, different approaches
in literature have come to common conclusions on “leaning-against-the-
wind” coordination between monetary and macroprudential policies (see
Angeloni & Faia 2013, Quint & Rabanal 2014, Popoyan et al. 2017) and stabi-
lizing gains from asset-based tools and contercyclical capital requirements
(see IMF 2013, Aiyar et al. 2014, Bridges et al. 2014, Cerutti et al. 2017).
However, the new post-crisis macroprudential policy remains more “mi-
croprudential”, and a focus on system-wide risk characteristics is lacking.
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Furthermore, owing to the overlapping transmission mechanisms of mon-
etary and macroprudential policies, how to combine these two policies is a
hotly debated question. While following real-world developments, two in-
stitutional models have emerged: (i) macroprudential policy is assigned to
a board, conducted separately from monetary policy; and (ii) macropruden-
tial policy is assigned to a central bank and conducted together with mone-
tary policy. Finally, partially because of a scarcity in historical, empirical,
and theoretical experience in dealing with macroprudential instruments,
and partially because of the difficulty in measuring systemic risks and an
underdeveloped analytical framework to assess the transmission channels
of those risks, financial crises are an objective reality.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides
guidance on the definition of macroprudential policy, its main objective,
the classifications of macroprudential tools, and discusses the coexistence
of monetary and macroprudential policy. Section 3 explores the recent liter-
ature on macroprudential policy impacts, its efficiency and interaction with
other policy groups. Section 4 discusses the pros and cons of the ability of
macroprudential policy to contribute to crisis management and to prevent
future financial turmoil. Finally, Section 5 concludes by discussing the focal
points of the paper.
2 Macroprudential Policy: Scope, Tools and Re-
lationship with Monetary Policy
One of the heritages of the global financial crisis of 2008 and its aftermath
is a painful reminder of the polyhedral macro-financial linkages and inter-
actions. The first common cause emphasized in the literature on the recent
turmoil is the occurrence of a rapid financial expansion, or credit boom (see
Koo 2011). As shown in Figure 1, the pre-crises period (until the first quarter
of 2008) was characterized by rapid credit expansion and real GDP growth.
However, during the crisis, both showed a noticeable drop. While booms
do not always cause crises, they do make them more likely to occur (Jordà
et al. 2015, Taylor 2015). Moreover, credit booms are mostly associated with
high leverage and post-shock rapid de-leveraging, which makes them more
dangerous and more painful (see Figure 2). In Figure 2 the evolution of the
leverage level for the United States and the euro area (2008 and 2011, first
quarter) are illustrated. The map captures the high leverage in both regions
and the post-crisis de-leveraging. These causes of a crisis have led to a shift
toward a macroprudential (system-wide) approach to financial supervision
and regulation (see in Bernanke 2008, Blanchard et al. 2013). Moreover, it
brought to an evolving debate about the interplay between macropruden-
tial and monetary policies in practice.
2020 University of Perugia Electronic Press 4
Popoyan: Macroprudential Policy: A Blessing or a Curse?
Figure 1. Real GDP and Credit Growth in the US and Euro Area in 1996-2012.
      United States                                                  Euro Area 
(a) Real GDP Growth.
        United States                                                  Euro Area 
(b) Real Credit Growth.
Note: The dataset is based upon that in Sarlin & Peltonen (2013).
2.1 Macroprudential Policy Toolkit
After the crisis, the need for macroprudential regulation was obvious to
policymakers, but there was no precise definition of macroprudential pol-
icy until 2011. The agreement on “Macroprudential policy frameworks”,
produced jointly by the Financial Stability Board (FSB), the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) in
February 2011, managed to establish a common language for policymak-
ers. The agreement defined macroprudential policy as “a policy that uses
primarily prudential tools to limit systemic or system-wide financial risk,
thereby limiting the incidence of disruptions in the provision of key finan-
cial services that can have serious consequences for the real economy by
(i) dampening the build-up of financial imbalances and building defenses
that contain the speed and sharpness of subsequent downswings and their
effects on the economy; and (ii) identifying and addressing common expo-
sures, risk concentrations, linkages, and interdependencies that are sources
of contagion and spillover risks that may jeopardize the functioning of the
system as a whole” (see the official document in FSB 2011a). A general objec-
tive of Basel III macroprudential reform is to design and implement a policy
that will prevent cross-institution or cross-market knock-on effects that can
magnify problems. A second objective is to reduce the likelihood that the
system as a whole will experience such knock-on effects. Hence, effective
macroprudential policy could contain risks ex-ante and help build buffers to
absorb shocks ex-post. Hence, the final objective of macroprudential policy
is to contribute to the safety, soundness, and stability of the financial sys-
tem as a whole. This combines strengthening the resilience of the financial
system and decreasing the build-up of systemic vulnerabilities.
Pre-crisis microprudential supervision contributed to financial stability
primarily in terms of the safety and soundness of individual financial in-
http://www.rei.unipg.it/rei/article/view/325 5
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Figure 2. Leverage in United States and Euro Area in 2008/1 and 2011/1.
Pre-crisis Tranquil 
Crisis Post-crisis 
(a) Leverage in US and Euro Area 2008/1.
Pre-crisis Tranquil 
Crisis Post-crisis 
(b) Leverage in US and Euro Area 2011/1.
Note: The figure displays the two-dimensional representation of leverage space. The lines that
separate the map into four parts are based on the distribution of the four underlying financial
stability states. In the left figure, the data for both the US and the euro area represent the
2002-2011, first quarter(see Sarlin & Peltonen (2013)).
stitutions only.1 However, this ignored the aggregate negative impact of
individual decisions on the financial system as a whole. In turn, macro-
prudential policy tries to fix this drawback by addressing two dimensions
of the systemic risk. First, it aims to identify and control the evolution of
systemic risk – the time dimension (“time-varying” or “cyclical” risk) and,
second, it tries to detect how risks are allocated within the financial system
– the cross-sectional dimension (“cross-sectional” or “structural” risk).2
The time dimension catches the collective tendency of economic agents
to increase their risk exposures during the expansionary phases of credit
cycles, and to rapidly unwind risk during the contractionary phases, due to
the overlay risk-aversion. This procyclicality intensifies in credit and liquid-
ity cycles induced by excessive leverage and excessive maturity mismatches
in financial institutions. During an expansion, the procyclicality described
above makes the financial system more sensitive to both endogenous and
exogenous shocks. Consequently, the build-up in aggregate risk increases
the probability of financial distress.
In contrast, the cross-sectional dimension identifies the distribution of
risk at a given point in time in order to contain domino effects. It focuses
mainly on the high interconnectedness of financial institutions, working
through the direct balance sheet channel (e.g., cross exposures) or through
indirect linkages.
The potential macroprudential policy armory is quite wide, with some of
1 I consider microprudential instruments as those that focus on the health of individual
financial institutions, and macroprudential policy tools as those that address risks to the
financial system as a whole (for a definition, see Osinski et al. 2013).
2 The classification is consistent with Kohn (2010), FSB (2011a), IMF (2011). For other clas-
sifications, see Hoogduin (2010), IMF (2011), ECB (2014), ECB Heads of Research (2014).
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the tools being used even before the recent financial turmoil.3 Table 1 classi-
fies these in a matrix form (see Claessens 2015). Vertically, the matrix covers
the policies and their goals. Horizontally, the matrix shows the intermediate
targets (e.g., changes in credit, leverage, asset prices, interconnections, etc.)
and methods.
Considering the goals of different types of macroprudential policies, it is
practical to categorize them into three groups (the rows in Table 1). The first
two groups try to reduce the probability of the occurrence and consequences
of financial risks by respectively dampening the expansionary phase of the
credit cycle or strengthening the resilience of the financial institutions dur-
ing the pre-contractionary and contractionary phases of the cycle. The third
group targets the risks arising from the direct and indirect interconnected-
ness of financial institutions. Along the horizontal axis, the table covers five
sets of tools: a) quantitative restrictions on borrowers, instruments, or activ-
ities; b) capital and provisioning requirements; c) other quantitative restric-
tions on financial institutions’ balance sheets; d) taxation/levies on activi-
ties or balance sheet composition; and e) other, more institutional-oriented
measures, such as accounting changes, changes to compensation, and so on.
Except for the tools in a), which aims to affect the demand for financing, the
other groups of tools affect the supply side of financing. The first four sets
of macroprudential measures (a–d) are meant to be time, institution, or state
varying, while the fifth is more structural.
3 A rule-based dynamic provisioning has been implemented in Spain since 2000 (see more
in Jiménez et al. 2017), and caps on LTV and LTI ratios in Korea were introduced in 2002
and 2005, respectively (see in Igan & Kang 2011).
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2.1.1 Basel III: New International Regulatory Framework for Banks
The post-crisis paradigm of macroprudential policy in terms of Basel III
regulatory accord aims to design and implement a policy that will prevent
cross-market or cross-institution knock-on effects that can enhance prob-
lems. Secondly, it aims to reduce the probability of financial system ex-
periencing such knock-on effects. Hence, effective macroprudential pol-
icy could contain risks ex-ante and help build buffers as cushion to absorb
shocks ex-post.
In terms of the global macroprudential regulation framework embod-
ied in the Basel III regulatory accord (BIS 2010), macroprudential tools can
be categorized into three broad classes: (i) capital-based tools (capital sur-
charges, sectoral capital requirements, countercyclical capital buffers and
dynamic provisions, leverage ratios)4; (ii) liquidity-based tools (e.g., liquid-
ity coverage and net stable funding ratios ); and (iii) asset-based tools (e.g.,
limits on loan-to-value (LTV) and loan-to-income (LTI) ratios).5 The three
classes of prudential instruments aim to increase the resilience to different
types of financial shocks, although in different ways. In particular, the first
group aims to improve the solvency of banks, the second one to resist dur-
ing temporary liquidity shortages, and the last targets increasing the quality
of the asset side of a banks’ balance sheet.
Capital based tools. From the beginning of 2010, when the urgency of
a new and strengthened regulatory framework for financial institutions be-
came clear, the Basel Committee started to create a framework to increase
the resilience of the banking sector. The Basel Committee reforms increase
both the quality and quantity of the regulatory capital. These reforms are
reinforced by a leverage ratio that should act as a backstop to the risk-based
capital requirement. The leverage ratio aims to constrain excess leverage in
the financial system and provide an extra layer of protection against mea-
surement error and model risk. Moreover, the Basel Committee is intro-
ducing a series of instruments into the global capital framework to curb
systemic risks arising from procyclical nature and the overconnectedness of
financial institutions.
Basel III introduced a countercyclical capital buffer (CCB) intending to re-
inforce financial institutions defences against the build-up of systemic vul-
nerabilities and to achieve the broader macroprudential goal of protecting
the financial sector from periods of excess aggregate credit growth that have
often been associated with the build-up of system-wide risk. The CCB intro-
duces a time-varying buffer over and above the minimum bank “core cap-
ital requirement” stabilized by Basel Committee.6 The common approach
4 Macroprudential leverage ratios differ from other instruments in the group by not being
risk sensitive, instead being based on capital relative to total assets.
5 For a transmission mechanism for each group of tools, see Committee on the Global
Financial System (2012).
6 In contrast to the minimum capital requirement of the pre-crisis Basel II framework
http://www.rei.unipg.it/rei/article/view/325 9
REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND INSTITUTIONS, Vol. 11, Issue 1/2 - Article 1
to set capital requirements is through a static “floor” of a minimum capital
requirement, which is well known to be procyclical (see Repullo & Suarez
2013, Behn et al. 2015). The countercyclical capital buffer is designed to
tackle procyclicality in the financial system. It builds-up a capital buffer dur-
ing periods of excessive credit growth. By increasing resilience during the
expansion (upswing), the CCB supports the sustainable provision of credit
to the economy in the contraction (downturn), and dampens the credit cycle
during the upturn (see Figure 5).
Figure 3. Buffer over the Financial Cycle.
                                                       Time 




Buffer add-on Release of buffer 
The framework attributes the credit-to-GDP gap as a barometer to guide
policymakers. Early contributions to the debate on its efficiency as an early
warning indicator of possible banking crises include studies by Borio &
Lowe (2004). Their findings were later confirmed for a large group of coun-
tries.7 Figure 5 helps assembling the analysis of when to “switch on” and/or
increase the required buffer. The process of capital buffer creation follows
three steps: (i) calculation of the aggregate private sector credit-to-GDP ra-
tio; (ii) calculation of the credit-to-GDP gap, defined as the difference be-
tween the credit-to-GDP ratio and its long-term trend; and (iii) transforma-
tion of the credit-to-GDP gap into the guide for buffer add-on. The size
of the buffer add-on (in percent of risk-weighted assets) is zero when the
credit-to-GDP gap (Gt) is below a certain threshold J .8 It then increases
with Gt until the buffer reaches its maximum level when the gap exceeds
(where total capital was subject to a limit of 8% of risk-weighted assets), Basel III is based
on a higher quality capital component, meaning Core Tier 1 capital, and must be at least
4.5% of risk-weighted assets at all times.
7 See, for example, Drehmann & Juselius (2014) and Behn et al. (2013).
8 The buffer add-on under the Basel III global framework is realized on top of the core
capital ratio of 4.5%.
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an upper threshold H . A Basel committee analysis found that an adjust-
ment factor based on J = 2 and H = 10 provides a reasonable and robust
specification, based on historical banking crises.
CCBt =

0, if Gt < J
(Gt−J)
(H−J) ∗ 0.025, if J ≤ Gt ≤ H
2.5, if Gt > H.
(1)
To be more clear, the guidance in Equation 1 suggests increasing the capital
if the credit-to-GDP gap increases substantially above its trend value (e.g.,
up to 2.5% of risk-weighted assets if the credit-to-GDP gap rises above 10
percentage points).
Dynamic provisioning is a method that allows banks to build-up loan loss
provisions during the expansion, and to withdraw such provisions during
a contractionary phase of a cycle. There is no unique dynamic provisioning
method.9 However, the fundamental principle is that provisions should be
set on long-run estimates, based on through-the-cycle expected losses. This
helps to break procyclicality and create countercyclical provision buffers.
The general method of dynamic provisioning can be expressed as follows:
Dynamic provisions = Through-the-cycle loss ratio * Flow of new loans - Flow of
specific provisions
As mentioned earlier, one of the underlying causes of the recent crisis was
the build-up of excessive on- and off-balance sheet leverage in the finan-
cial system. Basel III regulatory accord will introduce a leverage ratio from
2018. The leverage ratio prevents excessive on- and off-balance sheet lever-
age by limiting banks’ total assets to their equity. Because it is not based on
risk-weighted assets (as in the case of the static capital requirement), it also
provides a simple and transparent backstop to safeguard against model and





Capital surcharges for domestic and global systemically important financial
institutions are imposed to contain systemic risks that originate from cross-
exposures and interconnectedness in the financial system. The main goal is
to limit the effect of contagion from the failure of this institutions, to discour-
age exposures to such institutions or to excessively large exposures within
the financial system, more generally (see FSB 2014, Castro & Ferrari 2014).
An important advance is the determination of capital surcharges for global
systemically important financial institutions (G-SIFIs) and domestic system-
9 For the different types of dynamic provisioning, including comparisons, see Mahapatra
(2012), Wezel et al. (2012).
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ically important banks (D-SIBs) by the FSB and BIS, as an effort to achieve
some degree of consistency of approach (BIS 2012, BCBS 2011b, FSB 2011b).10
Liquidity-based tools. The crisis has highlighted the systemic external-
ities associated with funding or market liquidity risk, and sparked a greater
emphasis on liquidity tools that reduce vulnerabilities from a system-wide
increase in wholesale, short-term funding (Calomiris et al. 2015, Cooke et al.
2015).11 In contrast to the capital-based macroprudential instruments, at
first, there was little consensus on appropriate liquidity-based instruments.
Even before the financial crisis of 2008, microprudential liquidity regula-
tions were still in the development stage. Thus, practical experience deal-
ing with liquidity-based prudential tools with respect to capital-based in-
struments was rather limited. Even so, a range of liquidity-based macro-
prudential instruments have been suggested under the Basel III regulatory
accord. Liquidity ratios, such as the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) and net
stable funding ratio (NSFR), are microprudential measures until their value
is no longer attached to a variation in the macro environment. These tools
guarantee the resilience of balance sheets of financial institutions to liquid-
ity shocks, ensuring there is enough stock of highly liquid assets to cover
unexpected outflows.
The LCR under the Basel III is based on standard liquidity “coverage”
methodologies that were already adopted in internal management models
by banks to assess exposure to stress events even before the financial crisis
of 2008. The goal of the LCR is to promote the resilience of the liquidity risk
under the unexpected short-term liquidity shortage scenario. The LCR aims
to ensure that banking institutions have sufficient stock of unencumbered
high-quality liquid assets (HQLA) that can be converted to cash at little or
no loss of value in private markets. In this way, they can meet their liquidity






where HQLAt and NCOFt denote highly liquid assets and expected net
cash outflows for a month-long liquidity stress scenario, respectively.12
The NSFR is defined as the ratio between the stock of available stable
funding and the required stable funding, and should be not less than 100%
10 The additional capital surcharge on systemically important financial institutions is cur-
rently defined at a maximum of 3% and will be officially adopted from 2016.
11 Market liquidity is the ability to trade financial instruments at short notice with little im-
pact on price. Instead, funding liquidity describes the ability to raise cash, either via the
sale of an asset (balance sheet liquidity) or by borrowing. The two concepts of liquidity
are closely interlinked.
12 The “expected” net cash outflow refers to a special terminology of Basel III rule’s defini-
tion. In practice, it does not refer to expectations in the classic meaning of the word. The
“expectation of net cash outflow” refers to a computation of the possible cash outflows of
bank balance sheet components, computed based on run-off rates of assets and liabilities.
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on an on-going basis. “Available stable funding” refers to the share of cap-
ital and liabilities expected to be reliable over the time horizon considered
by the NSFR (one year, according to the Basel III regulatory). The amount
of described stable funding is a function of the liquidity characteristics and





where AASFt and RASFt denote the available amount of stable funding
and the required amount of stable funding, respectively.13
Asset-based tools. Asset-based macroprudential instruments quantita-
tively limit credit by tightening borrowing constraints for targeted groups of
borrowers. In practice, asset-based macroprudential instruments are often
assigned to residential mortgages and other asset classes (e.g., commercial
real estate, in India). Key examples of asset-side macroprudential instru-
ments are limits on leverage activated on a specific group or on individ-
ual borrowers, such as LTV, LTI, or DTI (debt-to-income) caps. The release
of LTVs, LTIs, and DTIs mainly influences the demand for credit (in the
case of capital and liquidity requirements, the impact is on the supply of
credit). The LTV ratio sets a cap on the size of a mortgage relative to the
value of a property, thereby imposing a minimum down payment. The LTI
and DTI caps impose constraints relative to the income of borrowers. In this
way, asset-based macroprudential instruments increase the resilience of the
banking sector directly by dropping the probability of default (PD) and the
loss-given-default (LGD) of loans.
2.2 Macroprudential Policy: Relationship with Monetary
Policy
Before the financial turmoil of 2008, monetary policy was converging
towards a single target, precisely inflation, and one tool, namely the short-
term interest rate. During this period, financial stability was considered a
distinct discipline from monetary stability. However, the post-crisis period
made clear that price stability cannot be seen in isolation from financial sta-
bility, and that financial stability has a systemic dimension that cannot be ig-
nored. Therefore, to guarantee macroeconomic stability, a macroeconomic
policy has to adopt financial stability as an additional objective, together
with macroprudential instruments that, constructed in a particular way, can
target sources of financial imbalances.
As already mentioned, a key function of macroprudential policy is to
moderate the procyclicality of the financial system by affecting the financial
13 In line with the timeline documented in the 2010 publication of the international frame-
work for liquidity risk measurement, standards, and monitoring, the NSFR became a
minimum standard by January 1, 2018.
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intermediation process. It operates on the leverage, assets, and liabilities of
intermediaries. In this respect, macroprudential policy and monetary policy
share some similarities. For instance, both policies affect the demand for
credit by reallocating spending over time, by either postponing it (i.e., by
inducing consumers and firms to borrow less) or bringing it forward (i.e.,
by inducing them to borrow more). Both policies affect the supply of credit
by influencing the leverage decision and funding cost of the intermediary.14
However, there are two important differences between monetary and
macroprudential policies. The first is that macroprudential policy is aimed
at specific sectors or practices. In some respects, macroprudential policy
harks back to the directed credit policies used by many advanced economies
until the 1970s, although these were used to channel credit to favored sec-
tors, as well as to constrain credit. The name is different, but the policies are
similar. In many cases, it is “old wine in new bottles” (see Shin 2016). In
contrast, monetary policy influences risk-taking more broadly, both within
the domestic financial system and across borders, and is more difficult to
circumvent. On the other hand, the broader impact of monetary policy cuts
both ways, because domestic monetary policy is constrained by global con-
ditions. This is the second difference between monetary policy and macro-
prudential policy.
It has long been recognized that monetary policy affects financial in-
stability (Goodhart et al. 1988). The literature has identified a number of
channels through which monetary policy influences financial stability and
macroprudential policy:
1. The borrower balance sheet or default channel: changes in the mone-
tary policy affect the borrowing constraints and the probability of de-
fault. While monetary easing relaxes collateral constraints, stronger
borrowing constraints can negatively affect the quality of borrowers,
14 For a comparison of the effects of monetary and macroprudential policies on financial
market counterparties, see Figure 6.
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resulting in higher default rates (see the following seminal empirical
papers Sengupta (2010), Altunbas et al. (2014), Jiménez et al. (2014)
and Goodhart et al. (2009) for theoretical support).
2. The risk-taking channel: an accommodative monetary policy can af-
fect the risk-taking behavior of financial institutions (empirical evi-
dence in Borio & Zhu 2012, Jiménez et al. 2014, Adriana & Liangb
2018). The monetary policy risk-taking channel describes how mon-
etary policy measures, especially a change in the policy rate or the
interest rate path, can alter the perception of risk or risk tolerance. For
instance, low interest rates can create a stimulus to expand balance
sheets, reduce screening efforts (Borio & Zhu 2012), and, consequently,
seek more risk associated with higher returns (Challe et al. 2013).
3. The risk-shifting channel: increases in policy rates can reduce interme-
diation margins and lead lenders to seek more risk (see more in Gan
2004, Landier et al. 2015). This channel can be more pronounced dur-
ing pre-crisis expansion, when intermediary leverage is high. More
generally, a flattening of the yield curve associated with increases in
policy rates can lead banks to seek risk in order to maintain profits.
4. The asset-price channel: by influencing aggregate financial prices, mon-
etary policy can exacerbate negative externalities. Low interest rates
can bring increases in asset prices, which can produce further increases
in leverage (Kiyotaki & Moore 1997, Bernanke et al. 1999, Altunbas
et al. 2012). Conversely, a tightening of the monetary stance can cause
collateral constraints to bind and fire sales to follow (Shin 2005). In
open economies, interest rate hikes can attract capital flows, lead to
excessive borrowing in foreign currency, and lay a foundation for ex-
change rate externalities (Bruno & Shin 2015).
5. The exchange rate channel: in an open economy, monetary policy can
affect the exchange rate and capital flows. In bank-based systems, cap-
ital flows can, in turn, drive credit growth/contraction and, owing
to the presence of exchange rate externalities, contribute to excessive
increases/decreases in leverage. This poses a well-known dilemma,
where raising domestic interest rates may induce excessive capital in-
flows and credit growth. Given the low policy rates in advanced economies,
a number of emerging economies (e.g., Brazil, Peru, and Turkey) have
been struggling with these problems (Merrouche & Nier 2010, Hahm
et al. 2012).
At the same time, macroprudential measures can contain adverse effects
for monetary policy, in that reducing policy dilemma, by creating additional
room to maneuver for monetary policy and influencing its transmission
mechanism. For example, limits on DTI ratios can weaken the impact on
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defaults from a tightening of monetary policy (Igan & Kang 2011). LTV ra-
tios can dampen asset price booms when accommodative monetary policy
drives up asset prices (IMF 2011). Changes in LTV or DTI ratios can also
change the supply of lending and, consequently, affect consumption deci-
sions. Capital requirements and leverage ratios can help hold back increases
in bank leverage in response to low policy rates and reduce risk-taking in-
centives (Farhi & Tirole 2012). Moreover, by changing credit conditions,
macroprudential policies could also influence the relevant real interest rate,
indirectly modifying the monetary policy stance, even in the absence of any
direct policy rate changes. Furthermore, macroprudential policies can affect
output and inflation, because they directly affect credit flows. For instance,
countercyclical capital buffers, apart from increasing the resilience of the
banking system, can promote the proper transmission of monetary policy.
This reduces the need for monetary authorities to compensate for the effects
of tighter credit conditions on output, because the countercyclical buffers
can help sustain the provision and serve as a cushion during the contrac-
tionary phase. In contrast, a lack of sufficient buffers may cause an erosion
of capital, pushing the banks towards a cut in the credit supply. This can
happen even when policy rates are lowered substantially. Today, macropru-
dential instruments are becoming an active part of post-crisis “new normal”
macro policy. Thus, an intensive accumulation and an analysis of previ-
ous and current practical experience in the effectiveness of macroprudential
instruments, and their interaction with monetary policy instruments, are
needed.
The above-mentioned examples reflect the possible tensions in the si-
multaneous conduct of monetary and macroprudential policies. Monetary
and macroprudential polices have substantially different sets of tools, as
well as different goals. Although their intermediate targets and instruments
differ, both policies have overlapping transmission mechanisms, because
their field of influence passes through the financial system (see Figure 7). In
other words, one shapes the playing field of the other. The effects of one
policy need to be considered in the conception and implementation of the
other. Thus, the two need to be coordinated, which is not easy, considering
that financial and business cycles could be de-synchronized. At the same
time, recalling the Tinbergen’s principle (Tinbergen 1952), different policy
goals call for different toolkits.
Theoretically, three different perspectives on the interaction between mon-
etary policy and macroprudential policy are possible: (i) an idealized per-
spective, which holds that monetary policy should focus on price stability,
and macroprudential policy should focus on financial stability and use its
own toolkit to achieve that goal (two separate institutions, two goals, no
overlapping interests); (ii) an extended perspective, in which financial sta-
bility is interpreted as an intermediate objective to the ultimate objective of
sustainable price stability (two separate institutions, two goals, monetary
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Figure 5. Monetary and Macroprudential Policy Interactions.
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policy considers financial instability signals, while making a monetary pol-
icy); and (iii) an integrated perspective, in which monetary policy adopts fi-
nancial stability as a second objective. The idealized perspective is founded
on the assumption that macroprudential policy is capable of reducing the
key problems in its area, precisely and effectively. According to this per-
spective, the risk-taking channel of monetary policy is viewed as insignif-
icant. IMF (2013) finds that the idealized perspective is an ideal scenario
that would never practically materialize in the real world. The extended
perspective represents a modification for the conduct of monetary policy: it
should not focus, as before, exclusively on achieving a short-run inflation
target, but must systemically incorporate the financial cycle into its deci-
sions in order to safeguard price stability in the long run as well. Unlike
the idealized perspective, the extended perspective assumes that it is im-
possible to eliminate an excessively pronounced financial cycle and, thus,
risks to financial stability with these tools alone. In terms of monetary pol-
icy, financial stability is interpreted as an intermediate objective to the ulti-
mate objective of sustainable price stability and, therefore, requires an ex-
tended policy horizon. The integrated perspective considers the separation
of monetary policy and macroprudential policy to be inappropriate. There-
fore, monetary policy encompass financial stability as a narrow objective as
well. Strictly speaking, the integrated view advocates using both macro-
prudential and monetary policy instruments (standard and non-standard)
in order to ensure financial stability, and, at the same time, price stability.
Over the past five years, many countries have accepted the importance
of a strong governance framework for implementing macroprudential pol-
icy. I examine the emerging macroprudential governance models and their
characteristics in EU member states and in OECD countries (see Table 2).
From Table 2, two obvious models appear: (i) macroprudential policy is as-
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signed either to a board, commissioned by different authorities, or (ii) to
the central bank. Although having a central bank at the head of macropru-
dential policy governance has advantages, especially in terms of account-
ability and expertise, there may be good reasons for creating a macropru-
dential board. Typically, financial stability is affected by different policy
fields, and identifying systemic risks may benefit from combining different
fields of expertise, as long as the committee has a clear macroprudential fo-
cus. Nevertheless, the involvement of several authorities may complicate
decision-making and weaken accountability, increasing the risk of an in-
action bias. For a board to be effective, its responsibilities and that of the
participating authorities should be clear. This will most likely be the case if
the central bank chairs the board (i.e., Denmark, Italy, Netherlands, Spain,
etc.), although this is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition. For a
majority of countries, it is the central bank that decides on the use of the
macroprudential tools aimed at banks.15 In a number of cases, these tools
are assigned to the supervisor or the government (i.e., Finland, Sweden,
Norway). Boards have only limited powers. Typically, they can issue non-
binding recommendations to the respective authorities, but cannot decide
on the use of macroprudential tools. Because countries have different le-
gal and supervisory frameworks, it is no surprise that they have created
different regulatory approaches. It remains to be seen which of these frame-
works will create the institutional incentives and mechanisms to ensure that
the authorities implement macroprudential tools in a timely and sufficient
manner.
In the theoretical literature, the interaction mechanisms between the mon-
etary and macroprudential policies are hotly debated. The main question
that emerges is as follows. Are monetary policy and macroprudential pol-
icy effective only when they tighten at the same time, or it is possible to
tighten one but loosen the other? In other words, must the two policies pull
in the same direction (be used as complements), or can they pull in opposite
directions (be used as substitutes)?
The majority of theoretical literature suggests that monetary and macro-
prudential policies have same effect in constraining credit growth, and that
the two tend to be complements, not substitutes, although results vary by
the type of financial shock (see in particular Quint & Rabanal 2014). The
complementarity theory finds support in the so-called Tinbergen’s princi-
ple, which claims that to achieve a certain number of independent policy
objectives, there must be at least an equal number of tools (see Tinbergen
1952).16 For the issue at hand, considering macroeconomic stability and
15 That is, central banks are the designated authority in terms of the CRR/Capital Require-
ments Directive.
16 Tinbergen (1952) showed that a policy can only attain a specified number of targets with
precision if it is endowed with the same or greater number of instruments. This does not
necessarily mean that each instrument needs be targeted at one and only one objective–
only that an adequate number of instruments must be available in order to achieve all
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Table 2. Macroprudential Authorities in EU and OECD Countries.
Macroprudential authority Country
Central Bank BE, CA, CY, CZ, EE, GR, HU, JP, IE, KR, LT, NZ, PT, SK, SZ
Supervisor AU, FI, IL, SE
Government NO
Board AT, BG, CL, DE, DK, ES, FR, HR, IS, IT, LU, MX, NL, PL, RO,
SI, TR, UK, US
Board chaired by
Central Bank CL, DK, ES, HR, IS, IT, NL, PL, RO, SI, TR, UK
Supervisor –
Government AT, BU, DE, FR, LU, US
Desighned authority
Central Bank BE, BG, CA, CY, CZ, EE, GR, HR, HU, IE, JP, KR, LT, MX,
NL, NZ, PT, SK, SZ, UK, US
Supervisor AT, AU, DE, FI, FR, IL, SE
Government DK, NO
Board FR
Source: Author’s collected data.
Note: AT-Austria; AU-Australia; BE-Belgium; BG-Bulgaria; CA-Canada; CL-Chile; CY-Cyprus;
CZ-Czech Republic; DE- Germany; DK-Denmark; EE-Estonia; ES-Spain; FI- Finland; FR-France;
JP-Japan; KR. Korea; UK- United Kingdom; GR-Greece; HU-Hungary; HR-Croatia; IE-Ireland;
IL-Israel; IT-Italy; IS-Iceland LT-Lithuania; LU-Luxembourg; NO-Norway; NL-Netherlands; NZ-
New Zealand; PL-Poland; PT-Portugal; RO-Romania; SE-Sweden; SI-Slovenia; SK-Slovakia; SZ-
Switzerland; TR- Turkey; US-United States of America.
financial stability as the two policy objectives to be achieved, and follow-
ing Tinbergen’s principle, two separate tools are needed: the policy interest
rate and a macroprudential instrument. At the same time, in view of the
high degree of interconnectedness between the monetary and macropru-
dential policies, it is fundamental that macroprudential policies be assigned
clear targets and given adequate instruments to implement them. Thus, a
straightforward application of Tinbergen’s principle stipulates that the ob-
jective of financial stability has to be paired with the necessary toolkit.
Models by Agénor et al. (2013) and Unsal (2011) document that when
negative financial shocks lead to distortions in financial stability, macropru-
dential policies are optimal, because these tools are more targeted at the spe-
cific financial sector distortion, whereas monetary policy has a “short hand”.
Their results are also robust in open economy cases. In open economies,
financial shocks can originate abroad, leading to an appreciation of the do-
mestic currency. While this limits inflation, when banks have foreign lia-
bilities, it leads to financial amplification by strengthening banks’ balance
sheets, causing credit to expand. As a result, macroprudential policy needs
to react more and monetary policy needs to react less, but the interplay be-
tween the two does not change markedly.
In the case of the DSGE models with a productivity shock, the results
greatly depend on the characteristics of the financial distortions. According
the policy objectives.
http://www.rei.unipg.it/rei/article/view/325 19
REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND INSTITUTIONS, Vol. 11, Issue 1/2 - Article 1
to the DSGE models, where only borrower collateral constraints are present
(such as Kannan et al. 2012, Bailliu et al. 2015), the results show that only
monetary policy should be used. Limiting credit is misguided, and runs
counter to the stimulus provided by monetary policy. DSGE models with
endogenous financial distortions (such as Lambertini et al. 2013, Brunner-
meier & Sannikov 2014) find opposite conclusions. Because lending by in-
dividual banks affects overall riskiness, it is optimal to tighten macropru-
dential policy to restrain the credit growth. However, the monetary policy
response to inflation remains unchanged from what is traditionally found.
Practically, the appropriate policy mix will vary, depending on the strength
and expected persistence of the productivity shock, as well as the riskiness
of balance sheets, including capital buffers and leverage. A similar discus-
sion applies to an aggregate demand shock. A monetary policy response
alone is optimal if it durably stabilizes both inflation and output. When
stabilizing inflation comes at the cost of lost output, and when lending im-
poses a systemic risk externality, there is some scope for using macropru-
dential policy alongside monetary policy in order to limit the systemic risk
stemming from the expansion in leverage.
3 A Literature Review of Macroprudential Policy
A consensus on the contours of a new macroprudential policy frame-
work has not yet been reached. The literature providing an impact/effectiveness
analysis of macroprudential policy tools and the ways that monetary and
macroprudential policies interact is still in its infancy, and provides limited
policy advice. Ultimately, the number of policy speeches, research contribu-
tions, and conferences that debate the macro perspective of financial regu-
lation, and the efficiency of the latter, has grown considerably (the notable
contributions are Vandenbussche et al. 2015, Freixas et al. 2015, Geanako-
plos 2014, Zhang & Zoli 2016). In addition, progress at the empirical and
theoretical levels offers new perspectives and ways to reshape older ideas
to meet new challenges.17 Table 3 provides a summary of recent studies
on the effects of various macroprudential regulation tools, as well as their
interactions with monetary policy. In particular, the next two sections (3.1-
3.2) analyse theoretical and empirical contributions focusing on efficiency
of macroprudential instruments and coordination issues of monetary and
macroprudential policies.
3.1 Empirical Studies on Macroprudential Policy
Empirical findings on macroprudential instruments and on their effec-
tiveness are few because of the scarcity of established models on the inter-
action between the financial system and the macroeconomy, and the scarcity
17 For detailed literature reviews see Galati & Moessner (2018) and Claessens (2015).
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Table 3. Studies on the Interaction of Macroprudential/Monetary Policy and Impact
of Macroprudential Tools.
Author(s) of Framework Tool analyzed Impact of Interaction
contribution instrument MoP/MaP
Monetary/macroprudential policy interactions
Benes & Kumhof (2015) DSGE CAR + COMP
Brzoza-Brzezina et al. (2015) DSGE LTV + COMP
Krug (2018) ABM CAR+CCB/LR + COMP
Alpanda et al. (2018) DSGE LTV/CAR + COMP
Guzman & Roldos (2014) DSGE RR + COMP
Ozkan & Unsal (2014) DSGE CAR − COMP
Quint & Rabanal (2014) DSGE CAR +/− COMP
Suh (2014) DSGE CAR − COMP
Zilberman & Tayler (2014) DSGE CAR+CCB + COMP
Agénor et al. (2013) DSGE CAR+CCB + COMP
Angeloni & Faia (2013) DSGE CAR + COMP
Lambertini et al. (2013) DSGE LTV + COMP
Smets (2018) CC CAR+CCB/LR/LCR + COMP
Kannan et al. (2012) DSGE LTV + COMP
Suh (2012) DSGE CAR/LTV − COMP
Popoyan et al. (2020) ABM CAR+CCB/LR/LCR + COMP
Angelini et al. (2011) DSGE CAR+CCB/LTV + COMP
Christensen et al. (2011) DSGE LR +/− COMP
Impact of the prudential tools
Zhang & Zoli (2016) Empirical LTV +
Bruno et al. (2017) Empirical CAR +
Cerutti et al. (2017) Empirical LTV/DTI/LR/DP +
McDonald (2018) Empirical LTV +
Alexandre & Lima (2020) ABM CAR+CCB +
van der Hoog (2018) ABM LR +
Vandenbussche et al. (2015) Empirical CAR/MMP +
Aiyar et al. (2014) Empircal CAR −
He & Krishnamurthy (2019) DSGE LR/CAR +
Balasubramanyan & VanHoose (2013) ST LCR +/−
Benigno et al. (2013) DSGE CAR −
Bianchi & Mendoza (2018) DSGE LR −
Boissay et al. (2013) DSGE LCR +
Claessens et al. (2013) Empirical LTV +
Crowe et al. (2013) Empirical LTV/DTI +
Kuttner & Shim (2016) Empirical DTST/LTV +
Adrian & Boyarchenko (2012) DSGE LR +
Cincotti et al. (2012) ABM CCB +
Lim et al. (2011) Empirical LTV +
van den End & Tabbae (2012) ST LCR +
Pariès et al. (2011) DSGE CAR −
Note: DSGE = Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Model; CC = Constructive Criticism; ABM
= Agent-based Model; ST = Stress-test models; COMP = in contribution monetary and macro-
prudential policies are compliments; CAR = Capital Adequacy Requirement; CCB-Countercyclical
Capital Buffer; LCR = Liquidity Coverage Ratio; LTV-Loan-to-Value; LR-Leverage Ratio; RR-
Reserve Requirement; MMR-Marginal reserve requirement; DTI = Debt-to-income; DSTI = Debt-
service-to-income.
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of data needed to conduct empirical analyses.18 This is also partially driven
by the differences in sample coverage and underlying policy studies (see
more in Cerutti et al. 2017). The main source of existing empirical analyses
is data on asset-based instruments aiming at borrowers, such as caps on LTV
and DTI ratios (see McDonald 2018, Cerutti et al. 2017, Zhang & Zoli 2016),
static capital requirements (see Vandenbussche et al. 2015, Duca et al. 2019,
Duca & Ling 2020, among others) , and institution-based policies, such as
dynamic provisioning as a prototype of a countercyclical capital buffer (see
in Cussen et al. 2015, Aiyar et al. 2014, Maddaloni & Peydro 2013, Shim et al.
2013), which was in use even before the financial crisis of 2008.19
The empirical literature on the use of macroprudential tools, as well as
their effectiveness, can be divided into two groups. The first group includes
cross-country panel studies that analyze the links between macropruden-
tial policy tools and financial indicators (i.e., credit growth, leverage, house
prices, capital inflows, etc.). Within this group, two distinct subgroups
are emerging: (i) cross-country contributions, focusing on asset-based tools
(i.e., LTV, DTI, etc.), and (ii) cross-country studies focusing on capital-based
tools. The second group leans on micro data evidence, covering either indi-
vidual banks’ balance sheet items or household borrowings.
Empirical studies on asset-based tools are the most diffuse, due to data
availability issues. One of the first cross-county panel studies focusing on
asset-based macroprudential instruments was analysis by Lim et al. (2011).
They analyze the links between macroprudential policy tools and develop-
ments in credit and leverage. They find evidence of macroprudential pol-
icy dampening procyclicality, mainly through credit-related measures (e.g.,
LTV, DTI caps). Similar results are obtained by Dell’Ariccia et al. (2012).
They find that macroprudential instruments can reduce the incidence of
general credit booms and decrease the probability that booms will have fur-
ther catastrophic impacts. They also highlight that macroprudential poli-
cies can reduce the risk of a bust, while simultaneously reducing how the
rest of the economy is affected by troubles in the financial system. More-
over, the empirical results document that LTV ratios can have a strong ef-
fect on house prices and aggregate demand (IMF 2013), which can justify a
gradual approach to tightening these ratios (as in Canada and the Nether-
lands). Another study focusing on asset-based prudential instruments is
that of Claessens et al. (2013), who provide bank-level evidence of balance
sheet sensitivity in 48 countries for the period 2000–2010. They find that
instruments aimed at borrowers – LTV and DTI caps, and limits on credit
growth – effectively reduce a bank’s leverage, assets, and non-core to core
liabilities growth during the expansionary phase of an economy. Practically,
18 The main part of global macroprudential instruments are not applied in practice. For ex-
ample, LCR will become a minimum requirement from January 1, 2019, and the leverage
ratio will become a minimum requirement from January 1, 2018.
19 For the possible and existing macroprudential instruments, see Table 1.
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LTV and DTI can reduce the feedback between credit and prices in an up-
swing, and improve resilience to shocks. This reduces the probability of
default and boosts the recovery values when the housing market turns (see
also Crowe et al. 2013). Cerutti et al. (2017) propose the most complex cross-
country empirical analysis on asset-based prudential tools (119 countries
over the period 2000–2013) and find that foreign exchange-related macro-
prudential policies are used more frequently in emerging economies, while
borrower-based policies are used more in advanced countries. They show
that using macroprudential policies can be associated with relatively greater
cross-border borrowing, suggesting that countries face issues of avoidance.
Cerutti et al. (2017) also find evidence of asymmetric impacts of macropru-
dential policies: some work better in a boom than in a bust phase of a finan-
cial cycle.
Some cross-country contributions on asset-based prudential tools focus
on the real estate market and house price dynamics. Using data from 57
countries, and spanning more than three decades, Kuttner & Shim (2016)
examine the effectiveness of macroprudential measures in stabilizing house
prices and housing credit. Applying panel regression methodologies, they
show that housing credit growth is significantly affected by changes in the
maximum debt-service-to-income (DSTI) ratio, the maximum LTV ratio, lim-
its on exposure to the housing sector, and housing-related taxes. Among
the above policies, a change in housing-related taxes is the only regulatory
policy tool with a discernible impact on house price appreciation. Crowe
et al. (2013) and IMF (2011) find that LTV and DTI caps decelerate prop-
erty price growth, slow property lending growth, contain feedback between
credit and prices in an upswing, and improve the resilience to shocks. Thus,
these caps reduce default rates and boost recovery values when the housing
market turns.
Cross-country studies covering capital-based tools are less common be-
cause these tools are newly designed and not fully implemented. That is
why these studies focus mainly on static capital requirements. One of the
most recent studies, Zhang & Zoli (2016), reviews macroprudential instru-
ments and capital flow measures using a data sample of 13 Asian and 33
other economies, starting from 2000. They conduct their analysis based on
constructed macroprudential policy indices and aggregated sub-indices on
key instruments. Their analysis suggests that macroprudential policy and
capital flow measures have helped restrain housing price growth, equity
flows, credit growth, and bank leverage. The instruments that have been
particularly effective in this regard include LTV caps, housing tax mea-
sures, and foreign currency-related measures. Carrying the same line of
Zhang & Zoli (2016) study, based on data of 12 Asia-Pacific countries, Bruno
et al. (2017) investigate the relationship between macroprudential and capi-
tal flow management tools. They find that banking sector and bond market
capital flow management tools are effective in slowing down bank and bond
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inflows, respectively.
The second group of contributions were conducted using micro-level
data, and are mostly analyses of one or a few macroprudential policies.
Jiménez et al. (2017), using Spanish micro-data, find that countercyclical dy-
namic provisioning in Spain smoothed the credit cycles and in bad times
supported firms’ financing and performance. However, the provisioning
did not contribute sufficiently to stopping the credit boom in good times
(see Saurina 2009). Using sectoral micro-data, Wong et al. (2011) and Igan
& Kang (2011) show that the LTV and DTI ratio caps effectively decreased
the systemic risk caused by house price cycles in Hong Kong and Korea.
Aiyar et al. (2014) examines micro evidence using a UK data set for the pe-
riod 1998–2007. They found that there is a statistically significant response
between the changes in banks’ capital requirement and credit supply (see
also Lim et al. 2013).
3.2 Theoretical Approaches in Macroprudential Policy
As we can see from Table 3, the vast majority of theoretical literature ex-
amines the efficiency of macroprudential tools and the interaction between
macroprudential and monetary policy in theoretical dynamic stochastic gen-
eral equilibrium (DSGE) models, while other categories of models (i.e., agent-
based simulated models and stress-testing model) are the obvious minority.
In DSGE theoretical frameworks, the macroprudential policy is addressed
from two specific aspects: i) with borrower collateral constraints and a bank-
ing sector (see in particular Brzoza-Brzezina et al. 2015, Agénor et al. 2013,
Lambertini et al. 2013), and ii) with a financial accelerator, as in Bernanke
et al. (1999) (see more in Quint & Rabanal 2014, Suh 2014, Kannan et al.
2012). In these models, monetary policy controls the risk-free interest rate,
and macroprudential policy controls the risk premium, or the spread be-
tween lending rates and the risk-free rate. Two main questions are analyzed
below, based on a theoretical DSGE model. Does macroprudential policy
have a positive impact on welfare and macroeconomic outcomes? Should
monetary policy respond to developments in the financial markets, despite
the existence of macroprudential policy?
While answering these questions, Brzoza-Brzezina et al. (2015) find in
their DSGE model of the euro area (“core” and “periphery” countries) that
appropriate adjustments in the LTV ratio can substantially lower the volatil-
ity of credit and output in the periphery. They also find that macropruden-
tial policy is particularly efficient at trading off monetary policy shocks and
shocks related to the housing market. Their welfare analysis also points in
this direction. A similar conclusion was drawn by Lambertini et al. (2013),
who consider a model of the housing market and study the potential gains
of monetary and macroprudential (in terms of countercyclical LTV ratio)
policies that lean against house-price and credit cycles. They find that the
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policy that responds to changes in financial variables is socially optimal.
The optimal policy for borrowers is characterized by an LTV ratio that re-
sponds countercyclically to credit growth, which most effectively stabilizes
credit relative to GDP (see also Alpanda et al. 2018). Lambertini et al. (2013)
also find that a countercyclical LTV rule, responding to credit growth, can
stabilize the economy better than the interest rate can. Another study fo-
cusing on the housing market is that of Kannan et al. (2012), who show that
strong monetary reactions to accelerator mechanisms, which push up credit
growth and house prices, can help macroeconomic stability. In addition,
using a macroprudential instrument such as the LTV ratio, specifically de-
signed to dampen credit market cycles, would provide stabilization benefits
when an economy faces financial sector or housing demand shocks. How-
ever, the optimal macroprudential rule under productivity shocks is to not
intervene.
Under the theoretical DSGE models, capital requirements receive most
of the attention in terms of an efficiency tool. Angelini et al. (2011) and
Christensen et al. (2011) develop DSGE models for the banking sector, re-
porting stabilization effects from a countercyclical capital requirement in-
troduced by the new Basel III regulatory framework. Christensen et al.
(2011) also find stabilizing gains from countercyclical bank leverage regu-
lation, as an optimal response to financial shocks, and lower efficiency of
the same rule in the case of technological shocks. Alpanda et al. (2018),
studying the effectiveness of different macroprudential policy tools, show
that, in terms of reducing household debt, sector-targeted instruments such
as capital regulations are the most efficient and least costly for reaching both
macroeconomic and financial stability. Suh (2014) examine the different ef-
fects of capital requirements on credit and inflation in a simple New Keyne-
sian model framework. In both models, macroprudential policy stabilizes
credit growth, but has a neutral effect on inflation. Instead, monetary policy
with an interest rate rule stabilizes inflation, but is “too blunt” an instrument
to stabilize credit.
DSGE studies that look for combinations of macroprudential and mone-
tary policies mainly follow on the credit-augmented Taylor rules, and “leaning-
against-the-wind” monetary policy. One of the fist studies to examine a
macroprudential–monetary policy combination was the model proposed by
Angeloni & Faia (2013). They find that the best combination of monetary
and macroprudential policies includes mildly anticyclical capital ratios and
the response of monetary policy to asset prices or bank leverage. Following
this stream of literature, Ozkan & Unsal (2014) analyze optimal monetary
and macroprudential policy rules for a small, open economy. The study
points out that, following a financial shock, “leaning-against-the-wind” helps
achieving macroeconomic and financial stability. Under a productivity shock,
it is more costly, from a welfare point of view, to respond to financial market
developments using monetary policy than using a macroprudential policy.
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Instead, Guzman & Roldos (2014) found slight differences from the study of
Ozkan & Unsal (2014). Despite showing that the countercyclical reserve re-
quirement delivers clear welfare gains, they show that the credit-augmented
Taylor rule delivers a substantial improvement to the classic Taylor rule.
Quint & Rabanal (2014) study the impact of jointly optimal monetary and
macroprudential policies on the macro performance of an economy. They
find that the introduction of a macroprudential policy helps reduce macroe-
conomic volatility, provides more welfare gains, and partly substitutes for
the lack of national monetary policies. Moreover, they showed that macro-
prudential policies may reduce accelerator effects. According to Quint &
Rabanal (2014), macroprudential policy in the majority of cases increases
the welfare of savers, but the effect on borrowers depends on the nature
of the shock that hits the economy. A similar conclusion came from Agénor
et al. (2013) while examining the policy mix of banks capital regulations and
monetary policy in reducing procyclicality, ensuring macroeconomic and fi-
nancial stability in a closed economy DSGE model. Exercises of housing
demand shocks show that a policy combination of a credit-augmented in-
terest rate rule and a countercyclical capital requirement, akin to the Basel
III regulatory framework, may be optimal to guarantee both monetary and
financial stability.
Another generation of models that discuss the effects of macropruden-
tial policy and the interaction between that and monetary policy use simu-
lation techniques. Within this class of models two approaches are emerging:
agent–based models (LeBaron & Tesfatsion 2008) and stress–testing models
(Borio et al. 2014).
AMBs are successfully being used to model interacting schemes between
monetary and macroprudential policies. Krug (2018) contributes to the field
of macroprudential regulatory impact assessment by addressing the ques-
tion of whether central banks should “lean-against-the-wind”. He shows
that “leaning-against-the-wind” should only serve as a first line of defense
in the absence of a prudential regulatory regime and, in this context, price
stability does not necessarily mean financial stability. Moreover, he shows
that macroprudential regulation is able to dampen the build-up of finan-
cial imbalances by restricting credit to the unsustainable high-leverage part
of the real economy. Another study using an ABM as a modeling frame-
work for policy assessment is the contribution by Alexandre & Lima (2020).
They study different combinations of interest rate and capital requirements
in terms of macroeconomic and financial stability (see also Dosi et al. 2013,
2015). They find that the adoption of a countercyclical capital rule un-
der Basel III regulatory framework is efficient in achieving financial stabil-
ity when used on its own, but performs worse when it is combined with
some interest rate rules. Contributing to the debate of monetary and macro-
prudential policy combination schemes, Popoyan et al. (2020) show that
a credit-augmented Taylor rule, focused on the output gap, inflation, and
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credit growth, and using a Basel III prudential regulation is the best policy
mix to improve the stability of the banking sector and to smooth output fluc-
tuations. Moreover, they find that the minimum capital requirements and
countercyclical capital buffers allow results close to the Basel III first-best,
but with a far simpler regulatory framework (Haldane & Madouros 2012,
Aikman et al. 2014).
Another stream of literature is assessing the macroprudential policy with
stress-test models.20 van den End & Tabbae (2012) present a macro stress-
testing model assessing banks’ liquidity risks when Basel III liquidity regu-
lations (LCR and NSFR) are in action and unconventional monetary policy
and credit supply effects are present. The results show that liquidity rules
under the Basel III regulatory accord limit liquidity risk and promote higher
quality liquid asset holdings. In another contribution, van den End & Kruid-
hof (2013) simulate the systemic implications of the LCR using a liquidity
stress-testing model, and find that if in extreme scenarios, the LCR becomes
a binding constraint, the interaction of bank behavior with the regulatory
rule can have negative externalities. They show too that a flexible LCR ap-
proach, particularly one that recognizes less liquid assets in the buffer, is a
useful macroprudential instrument to mitigate the adverse side effects dur-
ing times of stress. At extreme stress levels, the instrument becomes ineffec-
tive and the lender of last resort has to underpin the stability of the system.21
3.3 Generalized Picture of Literature on Macroprudential
Policy
A closer examination of the literature on macroprudential policy shows
four particularly interesting facts. First, the majority of contributions focus
on an analysis and impact of static prudential tools and, as a consequence,
the new countercyclical macroprudential regulation tools, which are a mile-
stone of the new Basel III accord, are not considered (Brzoza-Brzezina et al.
2015, Alpanda et al. 2018).
Second, few studies analyze the impact and the interaction mechanism
of more than one component of the post-crisis macroprudential regulation
(Popoyan et al. 2017, Krug 2018). The majority of studies consider the stan-
dalone impact of prudential tools.
Third, there are few empirical analyses of macroprudential tools because
of the scarcity of established models showing the interaction between the fi-
nancial system and the macroeconomy, and the scarcity of data needed to
conduct empirical tests. One of the reasons is that the main part of global
macroprudential instruments are not applied in practice.22 Notwithstand-
20 Stress-testing models are simulated models that test the stability of an entity or system
under adverse conditions and shocks. In comparison to ABMs those models consider a
single part of overall system and the shock are mainly exogenous.
21 See more on the negative effect of LCR in Schmitz (2013), van den End & Tabbae (2012).
22 The NSFR will become a minimum standard by January 1, 2018 (see BCBS 2012), 100%
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ing a scarcity of data, existing empirical studies manage to shed light on the
efficiency of some assets and capital-based tools. In particular, borrower-
based instruments (such as LTV and DTI caps) appear to be able to dampen
the procyclicality, reduce the incidence of general credit booms and the feed-
back between credit and prices in upswings. In addition, they improve the
resilience to shocks and decrease the probability that booms will end badly
(see, in particular Claessens et al. 2013, Cerutti et al. 2017). With regard
to capital-based tools, empirical evidence focuses more on static capital re-
quirements and on capital flow management tools. Specifically, the anal-
ysis suggests that macroprudential policy and capital flow measures have
helped curb housing price growth, equity flows, credit growth, and bank
leverage (Zhang & Zoli 2016, Bruno et al. 2017). In addition, there is a sta-
tistically significant relationship between the variations in a static capital
adequacy rule and the banks’ credit supply (Aiyar et al. 2014).
Fourth, the few studies that, at least partially, analyze the impact of Basel
III’s macroprudential instruments and the interaction of the latter with mon-
etary policy, use dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) framework
(Brunnermeier & Sannikov 2014, He & Krishnamurthy 2019). These models,
even when incorporating financial frictions, describe financial crises as huge
negative shocks and cannot capture the fact that crises are rare events result-
ing from “credit booms gone wrong”, followed by deep and long recessions
(for more see Dosi et al. 2015, Boissay et al. 2013, Fagiolo & Roventini 2012,
Stiglitz 2011). Although it is crucial, especially for an efficient analysis of
macroprudential tools, the interaction and coordination between economic
agents and, hence, between the real and financial sectors, and between fi-
nancial sector elements is completely neglected. Hence, the suitability of
these models to analyzing crises, namely situations where an economy is
out of equilibrium, using an equilibrium approach can be questioned. Fur-
thermore, under the framework of the DSGE model, analyses using the
same tool give controversial results in different models. These conflicts de-
pend on the nature of the shocks impacting the economy (for more details
see IMF 2013). With all the limitations of DSGE models, it is important to
remember the scarce ability of DSGE models to analyse the issues of macro-
prudential and monetary policy interactions. The aim of macroprudential
policy is to identify systemic risks at an early stage and, ideally, to avert
them. DSGE models typically cannot capture systemic risk; and the newly
developed DSGE models that include systemic risks are still too abstract to
be able to capture the interaction between monetary and macroprudential
policies (e.g., Bianchi 2014). The DSGE models surveyed were developed
to represent relatively small fluctuations in the model variables around a
stable long-term equilibrium (“steady state”). Thus, important features of
financial crises – such as an abrupt drop in asset prices, fire sales of secu-
of the LCR will become a minimum standard from January 1, 2019 (see BCBS 2013). The
leverage ratio will become a minimum requirement from January 1, 2018.
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rities, or runs on financial market institutions–can only be described to a
limited extent.
Bearing this caveat in mind, another class of modeling approach, namely
agent-based models (ABM), propose using a more adopted methodology to
assess policy interaction schemes.23
Those models are able to explain an economic cycle based on the com-
plex functioning of an economy, without any exogenous shocks (Ashraf
et al. 2017, Dosi et al. 2015). Consequently, there is a cascade of bankruptcies
arising from the complex nature of agent interactions. ABMs focusing on ef-
ficiency of macroprudential policy and its interaction with monetary policy
have demonstrated already very complex and converging results. In partic-
ular, Krug (2018)and Popoyan et al. (2017, 2020) found that it is beneficial
for an economy if the combination of macroprudential and monetary poli-
cies follow the Tinbergen’s principle. Moreover, together with Krug (2018),
Popoyan et al. (2017, 2020) document a stabilizing effect of countercycli-
cal capital requirement and marginal role of liquidity and leverage require-
ments.
Notwithstanding a scarcity of data, existing empirical studies manage to
shed light on the efficiency of some assets and capital-based tools. In par-
ticular, borrower-based instruments (such as LTV and DTI caps) appear to
be able to dampen the procyclicality, reduce the incidence of general credit
booms and the feedback between credit and prices in upswings. In ad-
dition, they improve the resilience to shocks and decrease the probability
that booms will end badly (see, in particular Claessens et al. 2013, Cerutti
et al. 2017). With regard to capital-based tools, empirical evidence focuses
more on static capital requirements and on capital flow management tools.
Specifically, the analysis suggests that macroprudential policy and capital
flow measures have helped curb housing price growth, equity flows, credit
growth, and bank leverage (Zhang & Zoli 2016, Bruno et al. 2017). In ad-
dition, there is a statistically significant relationship between the variations
in a static capital adequacy rule and the banks’ credit supply (Aiyar et al.
2014).
At the current juncture, experience and knowledge of the effectiveness
of macroprudential instruments, and their calibration and interaction with
each other and with monetary policy are still rather limited. Therefore,
model simulations (such as agent-based modeling approaches) are neces-
23 For relevant macroeconomic agent-based models with credit and financial markets, see
Delli Gatti et al. (2005), Ashraf et al. (2017), Gai et al. (2011), Battiston et al. (2012),
Geanakoplos et al. (2012), Raberto et al. (2012), Teglio et al. (2012), Dosi et al. (2015), Leng-
nick et al. (2013), Dawid et al. (2014), Krug (2018), Napoletano et al. (2015), Seppecher &
Salle (2015), van der Hoog & Dawid (2015), van der Hoog (2018), and the papers in Gaf-
fard & Napoletano (2012). See Fagiolo & Roventini (2012) and Fagiolo & Roventini (2016)
for a critical comparison of macroeconomic and financial policies in standard DSGE and
agent-based models, and Guerini et al. (2018) for an ABM comparable to a plain-vanilla
New Keynesian DSGE model.
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sary in order to study questions on the effectiveness of macroprudential
tools and the interactions between macroprudential policy and monetary
policy.
4 Is a Macroprudential Policy a Solution for Crises?
The recent financial turmoil made it clear that, notwithstanding that the
pre-crisis financial market seemed to be functioning well, with diversified
risks and robust institutional infrastructures, being individually safe and
sound and properly supervised, systemic risks emerged, having remained
undetected for a sufficiently long time to create the devastating collapse in
financial markets worldwide. Policymakers have sought to rectify the fi-
nancial catastrophe by imposing a broad set of financial regulations, both at
the national and international levels. The promising innovation rising as a
consequence of the crisis is the macroprudential policy. The core objectives
of macroprudential policy, embodied in the Basel III regulatory framework
(see BCBS 2011a), are to decrease the possibility and economic costs of pos-
sible systemic financial crises, to strengthen the resilience of the overall fi-
nancial system, and to smooth the credit cycle (i.e., the fluctuations in asset
prices, credit, and leverage). Recently, as such was identified the climate
change and the climate-related risks that pose a threat to financial stability
thought physical and transitional risks (see Carney (2015)). Accordingly, the
green macroprudential tools were called to safeguard the financial system,
at the same time canalizing the investments to green sectors (D’Orazio &
Popoyan 2019). In other words, macroprudential policy targets crisis man-
agement.
Considering the many similarities in crisis run-ups, it may seem that it
should be possible to predict and prevent crises.24 However, a crisis is still
a possible “reality”, and the “this-time-is-different” syndrome makes this
difficult to do, as shown in the literature on financial crises (particularly see
Reinhart & Rogoff 2009, Allen & Gale 2009). At this point, are the chances
of a system-wide view of financial regulation better in preventing future
crises?
Being one of the main buzzwords materializing from the last financial
turmoil, macroprudential policy gained followers and skeptics. In terms of
the first group, macroprudential policy is a literally a “mindset”, and they
believe that it can manage economic cycles and constrain the financial in-
stability inherent in financial markets and institutions. In the second group,
there is some skepticism about the possible effectiveness of macropruden-
tial policy. The sources of this mistrust include the following: risks to finan-
cial stability are difficult to measure; the analytical framework for assessing
transmission channels is underdeveloped; experience of the specific cali-
24 One of main similarities is the presence of credit and asset price booms, fuelled by rapid
debt accumulation. For more details see Claessens et al. (2014), Reinhart & Rogoff (2008).
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bration of the instruments is lacking; institutional and political-economic
considerations need to be looked at; and there are doubts as to whether all
forms of financial frictions can even be addressed using macroprudential
instruments (see Goodhart 2014, Haldane & Madouros 2012). This skepti-
cism may be connected to an unwillingness to accept that series of regula-
tory measures stepping in the free functioning of financial markets became
necessary to tame the excesses of finance. Accordingly, it is simply useless,
because crises are never the same and political economies of booms are such
that regulatory authorities will always find it difficult to smooth them.
It was clear from the beginning of macroprudential policy setup that the
system-wide view of financial regulation is not just for a supervisory need,
but also for the design of regulations. Both theoretically and empirically, it
is recognized that the safety and soundness of individually taken financial
institutions do not guarantee a stable and safe financial system.25 One of
many obvious reasons is the various fallacies of composition.
With all the progress made, there is unfortunately still too much puz-
zlement around macroprudential policy, and little consensus on how to op-
erationalize it. Partially, this is because its objective is defined very gen-
erally, but there is also little historical experience of using macropruden-
tial tools and empirical evidence to asses their effectiveness and calibration.
Furthermore, both theoretically and empirically, the measurement of finan-
cial (in)stability and systemic risk are hitherto in infancy, and there is no
much coherence on the influence sphere and institutional setup for post-
crisis macroprudential regulation. What are the strengths and limitations,
advantages and disadvantages of the nowadays macroprudential regula-
tory framework? What is the boundary of financial regulation? Where
are the systemic risks? How can one measure the systemic risk? How can
lessons drown from the history of previous financial turmoils contribute to
the crisis management abilities of macroprudential policy? What are the in-
teractions schemes between ts between the monetary and macroprudential
policies? These are questions that need answers.
From a macroprudential perspective, let us first note that, despite ob-
vious progress in the literature analyzing the efficiency of macroprudential
measures, the regulatory approach is still largely based on a widely crit-
icized microprudential structure of supervision, which does not lean on
“system-wide” characteristics of risks. Moreover, systemic risk (Haldane
& May 2011, Acemoglu et al. 2015) in modern financial systems arises en-
dogenously out of interactions between the financial market participants,
and cannot be captured only by individual financial institutions’ balance
sheets, especially when these metrics are static or backward looking. Hence
the macroprudential approaches need to be more targeted and addressed,
25 See Brunnermeier et al. (2009), Osinski et al. (2013) for a general discussion, and
De Nicoló et al. (2012) for an analytical review of a macroprudential versus a micro-
prudential perspective on financial stability and regulation.
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considering the interactions schemes across and between participants, mar-
kets, institutions, and across the different types of risks (e.g., market, credit,
liquidity, and operational). Importantly, the heterogeneity of financial insti-
tutions and the difference in their degree of vulnerability and sensitivity to
the same source of stress should be of specific importance for macropruden-
tial approach. Apart from missing a focus on systemic risks, many regula-
tory interventions fall behind for other reasons. Among those a scarcity of
an appropriate analytical tools and data to be able to conduct the possible
costs-benefit analysis of regulatory instruments. Furthermore, the data gap,
the heterogeneity between the statistics of different countries, due to differ-
ent definitions and methodologies in data aggregation, and the lack of in-
ternationally agreed-upon ontology on financial transactions (a single way
of describing and reporting the financial contract) represents an “Achilles
heel” of macroprudential policy making cross-border comparisons on effi-
ciency of macroprudential instruments more difficult. In this sense shadow
banking is of growing importance: the specific risks that emerge from these
under-regulated or unregulated activities are very challenging for macro-
prudential policy implementation.
In the current form the post-crisis macroprudential policy and its effi-
ciency can weakened due to regulatory arbitrages or possible cross-border
leakages in regulation. The former president and CEO of the Federal Re-
serve Bank of Dallas, Richard W. Fisher, expressed his opinion on this as
follows:
“[...] Macroprudential supervision is something of a Maginot Line: It
can be circumvented. Relying upon it to prevent financial instability
provides an artificial sense of confidence [...]” (Fisher 2014)
Approaches need to actively anticipate the side effects of one regulation
or action on others, as well as the financial innovations both within and
across jurisdictions to avoid “Goodhart’s Law” situations (Goodhart et al.
1988). Macroprudential policy may leak owing to regulatory arbitrage. As
already noted by O. Blanchard:
“[...]The reality of financial regulation is that new rules open new av-
enues for regulatory arbitrage, as institutions find loopholes in regula-
tions. That in turn forces authorities to institute new regulations in an
ongoing cat-and-mouse game (between a very adroit mouse and a less
nimble cat). Staying away from dark corners will require continuous
effort, not one-shot regulation[...]”(Blanchard 2014)
For instance, credit could be supplied throughout less capital-intensive
channels, for instance via securitization. Macroprudential measures can
give an incentive for “race to the bottom”, according to which liquidity and
capital may run out to the country with the lowest requirements. It is worth
mentioning that shadow banking can play a central role in feeding such reg-
ulatory arbitrage. Moreover, metrics should foresee, anticipate and limit the
2020 University of Perugia Electronic Press 32
Popoyan: Macroprudential Policy: A Blessing or a Curse?
probability if regulatory leakages between macroprudential policies. For
example, a capital requirement directive under the EU jurisdiction imposes
automatic reciprocity for countercyclical capital buffers up to 2.5%. This
means that if any of the EU countries introduces a countercyclical capital
buffer to smooth the financial cycle in its economy, all other EU countries
are bound by law to impose the same capital surcharge on banks’ cross-
border exposures to the country introducing the measure. This prevents the
so-called negative in-ward spillovers, whereby branches of foreign banks in-
crease lending to circumvent the restrictions set by the macroprudential au-
thority on local banks. Without reciprocity, macroprudential policy is prone
to leakages. Addressing those risks is challenging, for a number of reasons.
Firstly, shadow banking is an elusive concept that is difficult to quantify
using available statistics. Secondly, as I have argued, the tools needed to
prevent the building-up of excessive risks in that sector are currently not
in the set of instruments available to macroprudential authorities. More-
over, macroprudential policies could be weakened or strengthened by cross-
border spillovers. Spillovers depend on the behavior of both borrowers and
lenders following a macroprudential policy action. Positive spillovers re-
duce risks to financial stability, while negative spillovers raise these risks.
For example, if a country (say, country A) raises capital requirements in re-
sponse to excessive domestic credit growth, a neighboring country that also
experiences excessive credit growth (say, country B) might benefit from this
measure. If the financial markets are integrated, banks in country A will re-
duce their lending in country B, thus contributing to a slowdown in finan-
cial exuberance. However, if financial markets are segmented, or if finan-
cial cycles are not synchronized and country B is experiencing weak credit
growth, the sign of the spillovers from the same macroprudential measure
may turn from positive to negative. Negative spillovers clearly pose a threat
to the effectiveness of macroprudential policy. For policymakers, it is there-
fore crucial to be aware of the possibility of such spillovers and their respec-
tive propagation channels, to coordinate policies to the best extent possible,
and to apply mitigating measures to minimize leakages.
One of the most obvious fault lines in banking regulation, which was re-
vealed after the European sovereign debt crisis, is the general application of
zero-risk weights for sovereign exposures (Acharya et al. 2014). This defi-
ciency comes from the way the global bank regulation standards have been
applied in some countries, and especially in the EU. Combining a standard-
ized approach of the Basel requirement and the Capital Requirement Di-
rective (CDR) under EU jurisdiction, EU banks usually employ a zero-risk
weight for sovereign debt and, thus, do not hold capital against any of the
sovereign exposures to EU member states.26 Moreover, applying the LCR
26 The European Banking Authority (EBA) stress test in 2011 reports that only 36 banks out
of 91 participating European banks apply internal rating-based models (IRB) while com-
puting risk-weighted assets. Thus, 55 banks have sovereign debt with zero-risk weight.
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under Basel III, the European Commission treats all Member States bonds
equally, irrespective of any external or internal ratings, thus incentivizing
banks to hold sovereign debt and reinforce the sovereign-bank nexus.
In global capital framework of Basel III requirement non risk–based lever-
age requirement (that should be a backstop for risk–based capital require-
ment), in certain circumstances, can become the binding capital requirement
for banks (i.e. a first stop), rather than the back stop measure, originally
intended. A study commissioned by the Global Financial Markets Asso-
ciation and The Clearing House concludes that for more than half of the
institutions analysed the leverage ratio of the proposed framework, rather
than the all in Basel III risk-based capital requirements that include buffers
and surcharges, would become the binding capital ratio. In particular, the
prospect of a binding leverage ratio would effectively require much higher
capital for banks least risky assets, such as cash. This would reduce the
availability of lines of credit, thus constraining the pool of credit available
to support economic growth (for more details see GFMA et al. 2013). At the
same time there is some tension between the LCR and LR metrics: in non
risk-based leverage requirement equating low-risk assets with riskier assets
which produce a higher relative return than safer, low-risk assets, but also
carry risk of higher exposure could discourage banks from holding assets
such as cash and government bonds. At the same time, given that the LCR
encourages banks to hold cash and government bonds as part of a liquid
assets, there is a tension with compliance with the LCR. This would be most
relevant to those banks who would find the leverage ratio a greater hurdle
to overcome compared to the risk-based capital requirements. Hence, with-
out a system-wide view on both private and public provision of liquidity, a
microprudential liquidity rule can act perversely, as when all banks have to
meet a requirement at the same time. Therefore, reducing the risks of a cri-
sis requires a system perspective combined with a macroprudential toolkit,
some of which has to be global, given the close connections among finan-
cial systems and through international markets (and may have to involve
capital flow management tools as well). Furthermore, it requires proper
institutions to assure, besides system-wide risk monitoring, the necessary
remedial actions.
5 Concluding Remarks
The global financial crisis has challenged the prevailing monetary pol-
icy paradigm, showing that low inflation rates and comparatively moder-
ate business cycle fluctuations are not sufficient to ensure financial stabil-
ity. As a result, a system-wide approach to financial regulation in terms
of countercyclical macroprudential policy is required. Effective macropru-
dential policies (which include a range of constraints on leverage and the
composition of balance sheets) could then contain risks ex-ante and help
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build buffers to absorb shocks ex-post. Experience and knowledge on the
effectiveness of macroprudential policies, their calibrations, the interactions
among financial distortions and macroprudential tools, and the interactions
of those tools with monetary policy are still limited. The literature on the im-
pact/effectiveness analysis of prudential policy tools and the ways in which
they interact is developing rapidly, but is still in its infancy. Still, there have
been valuable experiences in using macroprudential policy tools, especially
in some of International Monetary Fund (IMF) studies (see Claessens et al.
2013, Zhang & Zoli 2016) have shown the effectiveness of several tools, espe-
cially those related to credit conditions for obtaining mortgages or mortgage
insurance and asset-based prudential tools. Furthermore, the theoretical lit-
erature reports substantial stabilizing gains from a countercyclical capital
requirement rule introduced by the Basel III reform package (see
Despite the relevant progress in empirical and theoretical literature and
macroprudential design, unfortunately, the macroprudential policy frame-
work is still largely based on a microprudential framework of regulations
capturing individual institutions balance sheets. The present framework
does not start from the system-wide characteristics of risks, and often misses
key risks. Considering that empirical evidence on the effectiveness of macro-
prudential policy tools is still scarce, the use of macroprudential policy tools
is likely to involve some experimentation and “learning-by-doing” practice.
Greater clarity is needed on the exact transmission and effectiveness
of macroprudential instruments, including their interactions among them-
selves and with monetary policy. Although intermediate targets and tools
of macroprudential and monetary policy differ, both types of policies have
overlapping transmission mechanisms, because they work primarily through
the financial system. One policy shapes the playing field of the other. The
latter reflects the tensions that can be inherent in the simultaneous imple-
mentation of monetary and macroprudential policies. However, at the same
time, the effects of one policy need to be considered in the conception and
implementation of the other, owing to the same interconnectedness. Thus,
they need to be coordinated, which is a non-trivial task, given that financial
and business cycles could be de-synchronized.
While following the real–world developments, two obvious models stand
out: macroprudential mandates are assigned (i) to a board, consisting of the
relevant authorities, or (ii) to the central bank. Although the second model
has a number of advantages in terms of accountability and expertise, there
may be good reasons for creating a macroprudential board. Typically, fi-
nancial stability is affected by different policy fields, and the identification
of systemic risks may benefit from combining different fields of expertise,
as long as the committee has a clear macroprudential focus. Nevertheless,
the involvement of several authorities may complicate decision-making and
weaken accountability, increasing the risk of inaction bias. Today’s macro-
prudential policy has a high national concentration. This does not account
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for the possibility of macroprudential policy being weakened or strength-
ened because of cross-border spillovers. This argument is especially valid
in the case of monetary unions.
With all the recent progress made, there is unfortunately still too much
confusion around macroprudential policy concepts and little agreement on
how to operationalize it. This is partially because of unclear objectives and a
scarcity of experience in using macroprudential tools in order to gauge their
effectiveness and calibration. Additional difficulties are that risks to finan-
cial stability are difficult to measure, the analytical framework for assessing
transmission channels is underdeveloped, experience with the specific cal-
ibration of instruments is lacking, and institutional and political-economic
considerations need to be examined. Moreover, the post-crisis macropru-
dential policy framework is still largely based on an outmoded and now
largely repudiated conceptual framework of regulations, which does not
start from system-wide characteristics of risks, and is still very much micro-
prudential. Systemic risk in modern financial systems arises endogenously
and cannot simply be captured using individual institutions’ balance sheets
or specific market or asset price-based measures alone, especially when
these metrics are static or backward looking.
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Blanchard, O., DellâAriccia, G. & Mauro, P. (2010), ‘Rethinking macroeconomic policy’,
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 42(s1), 199–215.
Blanchard, O. J., Dell’Ariccia, M. G. & Mauro, M. P. (2013), Rethinking macro policy II: getting
granular, International Monetary Fund.
Boissay, F., Collard, F. & Smets, F. (2013), ‘Booms and systemic banking crises’, ECB Working
Paper (1514).
Borio, C., Drehmann, M. & Tsatsaronis, K. (2014), ‘Stress-testing macro stress testing: does
it live up to expectations?’, Journal of Financial Stability 12, 3–15.
Borio, C. E. & Lowe, P. W. (2004), ‘Securing sustainable price stability: should credit come
back from the wilderness?’, BIS Working Paper (157).
Borio, C. & Zhu, H. (2012), ‘Capital regulation, risk-taking and monetary policy: a missing
link in the transmission mechanism?’, Journal of Financial Stability 8(4), 236–251.
2020 University of Perugia Electronic Press 38
Popoyan: Macroprudential Policy: A Blessing or a Curse?
Bridges, J., Gregory, D., Nielsen, M., Pezzini, S., Radia, A. & Spaltro, M. (2014), ‘The impact
of capital requirements on bank lending’.
Brunnermeier, M., Gorton, G. & Krishnamurthy, A. (2014), ‘Liquidity mismatch measure-
ment’, Risk Topography: Systemic Risk and Macro Modeling p. 99.
Brunnermeier, M. K., Crockett, A., Goodhart, C. A., Persaud, A. & Shin, H. S. (2009), The
fundamental principles of financial regulation, Vol. 11, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
Brunnermeier, M. K. & Sannikov, Y. (2014), ‘International credit flows, pecuniary externali-
ties, and capital controls’, Princeton University Working Paper .
Bruno, V., Shim, I. & Shin, H. S. (2017), ‘Comparative assessment of macroprudential poli-
cies’, Journal of Financial Stability 28, 183–202.
Bruno, V. & Shin, H. S. (2015), ‘Capital flows and the risk-taking channel of monetary pol-
icy’, Journal of Monetary Economics 71, 119–132.
Brzoza-Brzezina, M., Kolasa, M. & Makarski, K. (2015), ‘Macroprudential policy and im-
balances in the euro area’, Journal of International Money and Finance 51, 137–154.
Calomiris, C. W., Heider, F. & Hoerova, M. (2015), ‘A theory of bank liquidity require-
ments’, Columbia Business School Research Paper (14-39).
Carney, M. (2015), ‘Breaking the tragedy of the horizon–climate change and financial sta-
bility’, Speech given at Lloyd’s of London 29, 220–230.
Castro, C. & Ferrari, S. (2014), ‘Measuring and testing for the systemically important finan-
cial institutions’, Journal of Empirical Finance 25, 1–14.
Cerutti, E., Claessens, S. & Laeven, L. (2017), ‘The use and effectiveness of macroprudential
policies: New evidence’, Journal of Financial Stability 28, 203–224.
Challe, E., Mojon, B. & Ragot, X. (2013), ‘Equilibrium risk shifting and interest rate in an
opaque financial system’, European Economic Review 63, 117–133.
Christensen, I., Meh, C. & Moran, K. (2011), ‘Bank leverage regulation and macroeconomic
dynamic’, CIRANO-Scientific Publications 2011s-76 .
Cincotti, S., Raberto, M. & Teglio, A. (2012), ‘Macroprudential policies in an agent-based
artificial economy’, Revue de l’OFCE 124(5), 205–234.
Claessens, S. (2015), ‘An overview of macroprudential policy tools’, Annual Review of Finan-
cial Economics 7, 397–422.
Claessens, S., Ghosh, S. R. & Mihet, R. (2013), ‘Macro-prudential policies to mitigate finan-
cial system vulnerabilities’, Journal of International Money and Finance 39, 153–185.
Claessens, S., Kose, M. A. & Terrones, M. E. (2014), ‘The global financial crisis: How similar?
How different? How costly?’, Financial Crises: Causes, Consequences, and Policy Responses.
Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund pp. 209–237.
Committee on the Global Financial System (2012), ‘Operationalising the selection and ap-
plication of macroprudential instruments’, CGFS Papers (48).
Cooke, J., Koch, C., Murphy, A. et al. (2015), ‘Liquidity mismatch helps predict bank failure
and distress’, Economic Letter 10.
Crowe, C., DellâAriccia, G., Igan, D. & Rabanal, P. (2013), ‘How to deal with real estate
booms: lessons from country experiences’, Journal of Financial Stability 9(3), 300–319.
Cussen, M., O’Brien, M., Onorante, L., O’Reilly, G. et al. (2015), ‘Assessing the impact of
macroprudential measures’, Central Bank of Ireland Economic Letter series (3).
http://www.rei.unipg.it/rei/article/view/325 39
REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND INSTITUTIONS, Vol. 11, Issue 1/2 - Article 1
Dawid, H., Harting, P. & Neugart, M. (2014), ‘Economic convergence: policy implications
from a heterogeneous agent model’, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 44, 54–80.
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